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OVERCRIMINALIZATION 2.0: 
THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLEA BARGAINING 
AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
Lucian E. Dervan* 
In discussing imperfections in the adversarial system, Professor Ribs-
tein notes in his article entitled Agents Prosecuting Agents, that “prosecu-
tors can avoid the need to test their theories at trial by using significant le-
verage to virtually force even innocent, or at least questionably guilty, de-
fendants to plead guilty.”1  If this is true, then there is an enormous problem 
with plea bargaining, particularly given that over 95% of defendants in the 
federal criminal justice system succumb to the power of bargained justice.2  
As such, while Professor Ribstein pays tribute to plea bargaining, this piece 
provides a more detailed analysis of modern-day plea bargaining and its 
role in spurring the rise of overcriminalization.  In fact, this article argues 
that a symbiotic relationship exists between plea bargaining and overcrimi-
nalization because these legal phenomena do not merely occupy the same 
space in our justice system, but also rely on each other for their very exis-
tence. 
To illustrate the co-dependent nature of plea bargaining and overcri-
minalization, consider what it would mean if there were no plea bargaining.  
Novel legal theories and overly-broad statutes would no longer be tools 
merely for posturing during charge and sentence bargaining, but would 
have to be defended and affirmed both morally and legally at trial.  Further, 
the significant costs of prosecuting individuals with creative, tenuous, and 
technical charges would not be an abstract possibility used in determining 
how great of an incentive to offer a defendant in return for pleading guilty.  
Instead, these costs would be a real consideration in determining whether 
justice is being served by bringing a prosecution at all. 
Similarly, consider the significant ramifications that would follow 
should there no longer be overcriminalization.  The law would be refined 
and clear regarding conduct for which criminal liability may attach.  Indi-
vidual benefits, political pressure, and notoriety would not incentivize the 
  
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, and former member of 
the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government Investigations Team.  Special thanks to the 
Professors Ellen Podgor and Jeffrey Parker, the Journal of Law, Economics & Policy, the Law & Eco-
nomics Center at George Mason University, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and 
the Foundation for Criminal Justice.  Thanks also to my research assistant, Elizabeth Boratto. 
 1 See Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 617 (2011). 
 2 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2010), 
available at  http://ftp.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/FigC.pdf. 
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invention of novel legal theories upon which to base liability where none 
otherwise exists, despite the already expansive size of the United States 
criminal code.  Further, novel legal theories and overly-broad statutes 
would not be used to create staggering sentencing differentials that coerce 
defendants, even innocent ones, to falsely confess in return for leniency. 
As these hypothetical considerations demonstrate, plea bargaining and 
overcriminalization perpetuate each other, as plea bargaining shields over-
criminalization from scrutiny and overcriminalization creates the incentives 
that make plea bargaining so pervasive.  For example, take the novel trend 
toward deputizing corporate America as agents of the government, as illu-
strated in the case of Computer Associates.3 
In 2002, the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission began a joint investigation regarding the accounting practices 
of Computer Associates, an Islandia, New York-based manufacturer of 
computer software.4  Almost immediately, the government requested that 
Computer Associates perform an internal investigation.5  As has been noted 
by numerous commentators, such internal investigations provide invaluable 
assistance to the government, in part because corporate counsel can more 
easily acquire confidential materials and gain unfettered access to em-
ployees.6  Complying with the government’s request, Computer Associates 
hired an outside law firm.7  What happened next was both typical and atypi-
cal: 
Shortly after being retained in February 2002, the Company’s Law Firm met with the defen-
dant Sanjay Kumar [former CEO and chairman of the board] and other Computer Associates 
executives [including Stephen Richards, former head of sales,] in order to inquire into their 
knowledge of the practices that were the subject of the government investigations.  During 
these meetings, Kumar and others did not disclose, falsely denied and otherwise concealed 
the existence of the 35-day month [accounting] practice.  Moreover, Kumar and others con-
cocted and presented to the company’s law firm an assortment of false justifications, the pur-
  
 3 See United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 616-19 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Kumar, 2006 WL 6589865 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006); Indictment, United States v. Kumar 30-32 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/compassocs.pdf. 
 4 Kumar, 617 F.3d at 617; see also Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Beyond ‘Upjohn’: 
Necessary Warnings in Internal Investigations, 224 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Oct. 4, 2005). 
 5 Kumar, 617 F.3d at 617. 
 6 See, e.g., Morvillo & Anello, supra note 4 (“Corporate internal investigations have become a 
potent tool for prosecutors in gathering evidence against corporate employees suspected of wrong-
doing.”).  Though outside the scope of this article, another phenomenon leading to the growth of over-
criminalization in white collar criminal cases is the lack of aggressive defense strategies.  Where the 
government can secure convictions and concessions with mere threats, they have the ability to launch 
more investigations with wider reaches using the same resources.  See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Case Ex-
pands Type of Lies Prosecutors Will Pursue, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at C1 (quoting a Washington, 
D.C.-based defense attorney as saying, “An internal investigation has to be an absolute search for the 
truth and an absolute capitulation to the government.”). 
 7 Morvillo & Anello, supra note 4. 
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pose of which was to support their false denials of the 35-day month practice.  Kumar and 
others knew, and in fact intended, that the company’s law firm would present these false jus-
tifications to the United States Attorney’s Office, the SEC and the FBI so as to obstruct and 
impeded (sic) the government investigations. 
For example, during a meeting with attorneys from the company’s law firm, the defendant 
Sanjay Kumar and Ira Zar discussed the fact that former Computer Associates salespeople 
had accused Computer Associates of engaging in the 35-day month practice.  Kumar falsely 
denied that Computer Associates had engaged in such a practice and suggested to the attor-
neys from the company’s law firm that because quarterly commissions paid to Computer As-
sociates salespeople regularly included commissions on license agreements not finalized un-
til after end of quarter, the salespeople might assume, incorrectly, that revenue associated 
with those agreements was recognized by Computer Associates within the quarter.  Kumar 
knew that this explanation was false and intended that the company’s law firm would present 
this false explanation to the United States Attorney’s Office, the SEC and the FBI as part of 
an effort to persuade those entities that the accusations of the former salespeople were un-
founded and that the 35-day month practice never existed.8 
The interviewing of employees by private counsel as part of an inter-
nal investigation is common practice and few would be surprised to learn 
that employees occasionally lie during these meetings.  Further, information 
gathered during internal investigations is often passed along to the govern-
ment in an effort to cooperate.9  What was uncommon in the Computer As-
sociates situation, however, was the government’s response to the em-
ployees’ actions.  Along with the traditional host of criminal charges related 
to the accounting practices under investigation, the government indicted 
Kumar and others with obstruction of justice for lying to Computer Asso-
ciates’ private outside counsel.10  According to the government, the defen-
dants “did knowingly, intentionally and corruptly obstruct, influence and 
impede official proceedings, to wit: the Government Investigations,” in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).11 
This novel and creative use of the obstruction of justice laws, which 
had recently been amended after the collapse of Enron and the passage of 
Sarbanes–Oxley, was ill-received by many members of the legal establish-
ment.12  Echoing the unease expressed by the bar, Kumar and his codefen-
  
 8 Indictment, supra note 3. 
 9 Timothy P. Harkness & Darren LaVerne, Private Lies May Lead to Prosecution: DOJ Views 
False Statements to Private Attorney Investigators as a Form of Obstruction of Justice, 28 NAT’L L.J. 
S1 (July 24, 2006) (“[I]nternal investigations—and the practice of sharing information gathered during 
those investigations with federal regulators and prosecutors—have become standard practice . . . .”). 
 10 Indictment, supra note 3. 
 11 Id. at 38. 
 12 As examples, consider the following excerpts from news articles regarding the case: 
Defense lawyers and civil libertarians are expressing alarm at the government’s aggressive 
use of obstruction of justice laws in its investigation of accounting improprieties at Computer 
Associates . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The Computer Associate executives were never accused of lying directly to federal inves-
tigators or a grand jury.  Their guilty pleas were based on the theory that in lying to Wachtell 
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dants challenged the validity of the government’s creative charging deci-
sion and filed a motion to dismiss.13  The district court responded by deny-
ing the defendants’ motion without specifically addressing their concerns 
about the government’s interference with the attorney–client privilege.14  
The stage was thus set for this important issue to make its way to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (and, perhaps, eventually the U.S. 
Supreme Court) for guidance on the limits of prosecutorial power to mani-
pulate the relationships among a corporation, its employees, and its private 
counsel. 
Unfortunately, despite the grave concerns expressed from various cor-
ners of the legal establishment about the obstruction of justice charges in 
the Computer Associates case, the appellate courts never had the opportuni-
ty to scrutinize the validity of this novel and heavily criticized expansion of 
criminal law.  The government’s new legal theory went untested in the 
Computer Associates case due to the symbiotic relationship between plea 
bargaining and overcriminalization.  Three of the five defendants in the 
Computer Associates case pleaded guilty immediately, while Kumar and 
Stephens gave in to the pressures of plea bargaining two months after filing 
their unsuccessful motion to dismiss before the district court.15  As might be 
expected in today’s enforcement environment, not even the corporation 
challenged the government in the matter.  Computer Associates entered into 
a deferred prosecution agreement that brought the government’s investiga-
tion to an end.16  Once again, overcriminalization created a situation where 
the defendants could be charged with obstruction of justice and presented 
  
[the law firm representing Computer Associates] they had misled federal officials, because 
Wachtell passed their lies to the government. 
 
Berenson, supra note 6. 
 
While the legal theory of obstruction in these cases may be unremarkable, the government’s 
decision to found these obstruction charges on statements to lawyers is notable as a further 
example of government actions that are changing the role of counsel for the corporation. 
 
Audrey Strauss, Company Counsel as Agents of Obstruction, CORP. COUNS. (July 1, 2004). 
 
The possibility that lying to an attorney, hired by a defendant’s employer and acting in a 
purely private capacity, could lead to criminal charges contributed to growing concern within 
the criminal defense bar that the government was effectively transforming company lawyers 
into an arm of the state. 
 
Harkness & LaVerne, supra note 9. 
 13 See United States v. Kumar, 2006 WL 6589865, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006). 
 14 See id. at *5.  The court noted, “An objective reading of the remarks of the Senators and Repre-
sentatives compels the conclusion that what they plainly sought to eliminate was corporate criminality in 
all of its guises which, in the final analysis, had the effect of obstructing, influencing or, impeding 
justice being pursued in an ‘official proceeding’ . . . .”  Id. at *4. 
 15 United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 16 Kumar, 617 F.3d at 617. 
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with significant incentives to plead guilty, while plea bargaining ensured 
these novel legal theories would go untested. 
Given the symbiotic existence of plea bargaining and overcriminaliza-
tion, perhaps the answer to overcriminalization does not lie solely in chang-
ing imperfect prosecutorial incentives or changing the nature of corporate 
liability—it may also lie in changing the game itself.17  Perhaps the time has 
come to reexamine the role of plea bargaining in our criminal justice sys-
tem. 
While the right to plead guilty dates back to English common law, the 
evolution of plea bargaining into a force that consumes over 95% of defen-
dants in the American criminal justice system mainly took place in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.18  In particular, appellate courts after the 
Civil War witnessed an influx of appeals involving “bargains” between 
defendants and prosecutors.19  While courts uniformly rejected these early 
attempts at bargained justice, deals escaping judicial review continued to be 
struck by defendants and prosecutors.20 
By the turn of the twentieth century, plea bargaining was on the rise as 
overcriminalization flourished and courts became weighed down with ever-
growing dockets.21  According to one observer, over half of the defendants 
in at least one major urban criminal justice system in 1912 were charged 
with crimes that had not existed a quarter century before.22  The challenges 
presented by the growing number of prosecutions in the early twentieth 
  
 17 See Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 617 (2011) (proposing 
to address overcriminalization in the context of corporate liability by changing imperfect incentives and 
the nature of corporate liability itself). 
 18 See Lucian E. Dervan, Plea Bargaining’s Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, A 
Continued Triumph in a Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 478 (2007) (discussing the rise of 
plea bargaining in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nine-
teenth Century Context, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273, 273 (1978) (“[Alschuler and Friedman] agree that 
plea bargaining was probably nonexistent before 1800, began to appear during the early or mid-
nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as a standard feature of American urban criminal courts 
in the last third of the nineteenth century.”); see also John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short Histo-
ry of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261 (1978); Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History 
of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 281 (1978); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea 
Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287 (1978). 
 19 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1979) (“It 
was only after the Civil War that cases of plea bargaining began to appear in American appellate court 
reports.”). 
 20 See id. at 19-22.  In particular, plea bargaining appears to have grown in prominence because 
judges and prosecutors began accepting bribes from defendants in return for “plea agreements” that 
guaranteed reduced sentences.  According to Professor Albert Alschuler, “The gap between these judi-
cial denunciations of plea bargaining [in the late nineteenth century] and the practice of many urban 
courts at the turn of the century and thereafter was apparently extreme.  In these courts, striking political 
corruption apparently contributed to a flourishing practice of plea bargaining.”  Id. at 24. 
 21 Id. at 5, 19, 27. 
 22 Id. at 32. 
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century accelerated with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the 
beginning of the Prohibition Era.23  To cope with the strain on the courts, 
the symbiotic relationship between overcriminalization and plea bargaining 
was born: 
[F]ederal prosecutions under the Prohibition Act terminated in 1930 had become nearly eight 
times as many as the total of all pending federal prosecutions in 1914.  In a number of urban 
districts the enforcement agencies maintain that the only practicable way of meeting this sit-
uation with the existing machinery of federal courts . . . is for the United States Attorneys to 
make bargains with defendants or their counsel whereby defendants plead guilty to minor of-
fenses and escape with light penalties.24 
In return for agreeing not to challenge the government’s legal asser-
tions and for assisting in lessening the strain created by overcriminalization, 
defendants were permitted to plead guilty to reduced charges and in return 
for lighter sentences.25  The strategy of using plea bargaining to move cases 
through the system was effective, as the number of defendants relieving the 
government of its burden at trial swelled.  Between the early 1900s and 
1916, the number of federal cases concluding with a guilty plea rose sharp-
ly from 50% to 72%.26  By 1925, the number had reached 90%.27 
By 1967, the relationship between plea bargaining and overcriminali-
zation had so solidified that even the American Bar Association (ABA) 
proclaimed the benefits of bargained justice for a system that remained un-
able to grapple with the continued growth of dockets and the criminal 
code.28  The ABA stated: 
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system.  Such 
pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the 
need for funds and personnel.  If the number of judges, courtrooms, court personnel and 
counsel for prosecution and defense were to be increased substantially, the funds necessary 
for such increases might be diverted from elsewhere in the criminal justice process.  Moreo-
  
 23 Alschuler, supra note 19, at 5, 27; see also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A 
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 8 (2003). 
 24 Alschuler, supra note 19, at 27 (citing Nat’l Comm’n On Law Observance & Enforcement, 
Report On The Enforcement Of The Prohibition Laws Of The United States 56 (1931)). 
 25 Id. at 29; see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of 
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155, 1156-61 (2005) (discussing the relationship be-
tween broadening legal rules and plea bargaining); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519-20 (2001) (discussing the influence of broader laws on the 
rate of plea bargaining); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Crimi-
nal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129 (2005) (“Changes in federal sentencing practices during the 
1980s and 1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going to trial, and mightily influ-
enced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during those times.”). 
 26 Alschuler, supra note 19, at 27. 
 27 Id. 
 28 AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (Approved Draft, 1968). 
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ver, the limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for 
contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of in-
nocence.29 
Interestingly, although plea bargaining had gained widespread approv-
al by the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court had yet to rule on the constitutio-
nality of bargained justice.  Finally, in 1970, the Court took up Brady v. 
United States,30 a case decided in the shadows of a criminal justice system 
that had grown reliant on a force that led 90% of defendants to waive their 
right to trial and confess their guilt in court.31 
In Brady, the defendant was charged under a federal kidnapping sta-
tute that allowed for the death penalty if a defendant was convicted by a 
jury.32  This meant that defendants who pleaded guilty could avoid the capi-
tal sanction by avoiding a jury verdict altogether.33  According to Brady, 
this statutory incentive led him to plead guilty involuntarily for fear that he 
might otherwise be put to death.34  The Brady Court, however, concluded 
that it is permissible for a criminal defendant to plead guilty in exchange for 
the probability of a lesser punishment,35 a ruling likely necessitated by the 
reality that the criminal justice system would collapse if plea bargaining 
was invalidated. 
While the Brady decision signaled the Court’s acceptance of plea bar-
gaining, it contained an important caveat regarding how far the Court would 
permit prosecutors to venture in attempting to induce guilty pleas.  In Bra-
dy’s concluding paragraphs, the Court stated that plea bargaining was a tool 
for use only in cases where the evidence was overwhelming and the defen-
dant, unlikely to succeed at trial, might benefit from the opportunity to bar-
gain for a reduced sentence,36 a stance strikingly similar to the ABA’s at the 
time.37  According to the Court, plea bargaining was not to be used to over-
whelm defendants and force them to plead guilty where guilt was uncertain: 
  
 29 Id. 
 30 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
 31 Diana Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Post-Conviction 
DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1429, 1439 n.43 
(2004) (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bar-
gaining Context, 80 WASH. U.L. Q. 1, 1 (2002)) (noting that since the 1960s the plea bargaining rate has 
been around ninety percent); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 28, at 1-2 (“The plea of guilty is 
probably the most frequent method of conviction in all jurisdictions; in some localities as many as 95 
per cent of the criminal cases are disposed of this way.”).  Today, pleas of guilty account for over 95% 
of all federal cases.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 2. 
 32 Brady, 397 U.S. at 743. 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. at 743-44. 
 35 Id. at 747, 751. 
 36 Id. at 752. 
 37 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 28, at 2. 
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For a Defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty 
and limiting the probable penalty are obvious – his exposure is reduced, the correctional 
processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.  For the 
State there are also advantages – the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission 
of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of 
trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there 
is a substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the 
State can sustain its burden of proof.38 
According to the Court, if judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel 
failed to observe these constitutional limitations, the Court would be forced 
to reconsider its approval of the plea bargaining system altogether:39 
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazard for the innocent or that the me-
thods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are necessarily valid in all re-
spects.  This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the 
jury.  Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we should contin-
ue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial.  We would have serious doubts about 
this case if the encouragement increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by compe-
tent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.40 
Unfortunately, evidence from the last forty years shows that Brady’s 
attempt to limit plea bargaining has not been successful.  For example, as 
Professor Ribstein noted, today even innocent defendants can be persuaded 
by the staggering incentives to confess one’s guilt in return for a bargain.41  
  
 38 Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). 
 39 Id. at 758. 
 40 Id. at 757-58.  The sentiment that innocent defendants should not be encouraged to plead guilty 
has been echoed by academics.  See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values 
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 
1382 (2003) (“Even if innocent defendants want to plead guilty, the law should not go out of its way to 
promote these unjust results.”); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1158 (2005) (supporting Bibas’ statements regarding innocent 
defendants and plea bargaining). 
 41 See Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal 
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 295 (1975) (“On the basis of the analysis that follows, I conclude that 
the pressure on defendants to plead guilty in the federal courts has induced a high rate of conviction by 
‘consent’ in cases in which no conviction would have been obtained if there had been a contest.”); 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1949-51 (1992) 
(discussing plea bargaining’s innocence problem); David L Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclu-
sive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 39-46 (1984) (discussing innocent defendants and plea bargaining); 
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Really Acquit the Innocent?, 
49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1343-44 (1997) (“[T]he results of our research suggest that some defendants 
who perhaps were innocent, and a larger group who probably would have been acquitted had the case 
gone to trial, were nonetheless induced to plead guilty.”); see also Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea 
Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 74 (2009) (“Plea bargaining has an 
innocence problem.”); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 
2295-96 (2006) (arguing a partial ban on plea bargaining would assist in preventing innocent defendants 
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Importantly, this failure of the Brady limitation is due in part to the fact that 
overcriminalization, the phenomenon that initially created swelling dockets 
and the need for plea bargaining, makes creating the incentives to plead 
guilty easy by propagating a myriad of broad statutes from which stagger-
ing sentencing differentials can be created.  All the while, plea bargains 
prevent these incentives, sentencing differentials, and, in fact, overcrimina-
lization itself, from being reviewed.42 
Plea bargaining’s drift into constitutionally impermissible territory un-
der Brady’s express language indicates the existence of both a problem and 
an opportunity.  The problem is that the utilization of large sentencing dif-
ferentials based, at least in part, on novel legal theories and overly-broad 
statutes, results in increasingly more defendants pleading guilty.  Despite 
the ever-growing number of Americans captured by the criminal justice 
system through an increasingly wide application of novel legal theories and 
overly-broad statutes, these theories and statutes are seldom tested.  No one 
is left to challenge their application—everyone has pleaded guilty instead. 
The opportunity is to challenge plea bargaining and reject arguments 
in favor of limitless incentives that may be offered in exchange for pleading 
guilty.  This endeavor is not without support; Brady itself is the guide.  By 
focusing on changing the entire game, it may be possible to restore justice 
to a system mired in posturing and negotiation about charges and assertions 
that will never be challenged in court.  Such a challenge may also slow or 
even reverse the subjugation of Americans to the costs, both social and 
moral, of overcriminalization—plea bargaining’s unfortunate mutualistic 
symbiont. 
The great difficulty lies in bringing the problem to the forefront so that 
it can be examined anew.  Who among those offered the types of sentencing 
differentials created through the use of novel legal theories and overly 
broad statutes will reject the incentives and challenge the system as a 
whole? Will it be someone like Lea Fastow? 
From 1991 to 1997, Lea Fastow, the wife of Enron Chief Financial Of-
ficer Andrew Fastow, served as a Director of Enron and its Assistant Trea-
surer of Corporate Finance.43  Although Ms. Fastow was a stay-at-home 
mother raising two small children in 2001, federal investigators determined 
that she had known of her husband’s fraudulent financial dealings and had 
  
from being forced to plead guilty by forcing asset allocation by prosecutors towards only strong cases); 
Leipold, supra note 40, at 1154 (“Yet we know that sometimes innocent people plead guilty . . . .”). 
 42 See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 78 (2010) (“The pronounced gap between those risking trial and those securing 
pleas is what raises concerns here.  Some refer to this as a ‘trial penalty’ while others value the coopera-
tion and support the vastly reduced sentences.”). 
 43 Michelle S. Jacobs, Loyalty’s Reward–A Felony Conviction: Recent Prosecutions of High-
Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 843, 856 (2006). 
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even assisted him in perpetrating the frauds.44  In response, the government, 
which had already indicted her husband, indicted her under a six-count in-
dictment that included charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, con-
spiracy to defraud the United States, money laundering conspiracy, aiding 
and abetting, and filing a false tax return.45 
Based on the indictment’s allegations, Ms. Fastow faced a possible 
ten-year prison sentence, but the government was more interested in per-
suading her to cooperate.46  As a result, the government offered her a deal.47  
In return for pleading guilty, the government would charge her with a single 
count of filing a false tax return, which carried a recommended sentence of 
five months in prison.48  The deal also included an agreement that Ms. Fas-
tow and her husband, who also intended to plead guilty in return for lenien-
cy, would not have to serve their prison sentences simultaneously, thus en-
suring their children would always have one parent at home.49  As the lead 
prosecutor in the case stated, “The Fastows’ children can be taken into ac-
count in deciding when Andrew Fastow will begin serving his sentence.  
  
 44 Id. at 856-57. 
 
During the time in question, Andrew Fastow and Michael Kopper created several Special 
Purpose Entities (SPEs) to hold off-balance sheet treatment of assets held by Enron. . . .  Ms. 
Fastow assisted with concealing the fraudulent nature of two of the SPEs.  In both cases, Ms. 
Fastow accepted “gifts” in her name and in the names of her children, knowing that the gifts 
were kickbacks.  In another instance, the Fastows were attempting to hide the fact that Ms. 
Fastow’s father was used as an “independent” third party of RADR [one of the two SPEs].  
When the Fastows realized that the father’s ownership would trigger a reporting requirement, 
they had him pull out of the deal.  Ms. Fastow convinced her father to file a false tax return 
in an effort to continue hiding their involvement in the SPE. 
 
Id.; see also Mary Flood, Lea Fastow in Plea-Bargain Talks; Former Enron CFO’s Wife Could Get 5-
month Term but Deal Faces Hurdles, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2003, at A1. 
 45 Indictment, United States v. Fastow (S.D.T.X. 2003), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usleafstw43003ind.pdf. 
 46 The ten year sentence is calculated using the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines for fraud.  Beginning 
with a base offense level of six points, Fastow would have received twenty points for a $17 million loss, 
and four points for an offense involving more than fifty people.  A defendant with no previous criminal 
history and thirty points has a sentencing range between 97 to 121 months.  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2002). 
 47 Flood, supra note 44, at A1. 
 48 See Bruce Zucker, Settling Federal Criminal Cases in the Post-Enron Era: The Role of the 
Court and Probation Office in Plea Bargaining Federal White Collar Cases, 6 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 
3-4 (2004). 
 49 See Jacobs, supra note 43, at 859. 
 
During the renegotiation of the second plea, it was widely reported that Ms. Fastow was in-
terested in a plea that would allow her children to stay at home with one parent while the 
other was incarcerated, rather than running the risk that both parents would be incarcerated at 
the same time.  The government apparently acquiesced to this request. 
Id. 
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There is no reason for the government, when it can, to have a husband and 
wife serve their sentences at the same time.”50 
For Lea Fastow, the reality of her situation removed any free will she 
might have had to weigh her options.51  With two small children at home 
and the prospect of simultaneous prison sentences for her and her husband, 
the decision to accept the offer was made for her.52  As one family friend 
stated, “It’s a matter of willing to risk less when it’s for her children than 
she would risk if it were just for herself.”53  As such, she succumbed to the 
pressure to confess her guilt and accepted the deal.54 
Though the judge in the case would force the government to revise its 
offer because he believed five months was too lenient, Lea Fastow would 
eventually plead guilty to a misdemeanor tax charge and serve one year in 
prison.55  The agreement to confess her guilt in return for a promise of le-
niency lessened her sentence by nine years and ensured that her children 
would not be without a parent.56  As promised, Andrew Fastow was not 
required to report to prison for his offenses until after his wife was re-
leased.57  As has become all too familiar today, Lea Fastow did not chal-
lenge the use of sentencing differentials and bargaining incentives.  She did 
not ask the Supreme Court to examine modern-day plea bargaining against 
the standards established in Brady forty years ago.  Just as is true of so 
many other defendants, she pleaded guilty instead. 
And so we wait. 
  
 50 Mary Flood & Clifford Pugh, Lea Fastow Expresses “Regret” at Sentencing; Wife of ex-Enron 
CFO Faces Year in Prison, HOUS. CHRON., May 7, 2004, at A19. 
 51 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (“[T]he question in each case is whether the 
defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed.  If so, the confession cannot be deemed ‘the 
product of a rational intellect and a free will.’”) (internal citations removed). 
 52 See Greg Farrell & Jayne O’Donnell, Plea Deals Appear Close for Fastows, USA TODAY, Jan. 
8, 2004, at 1B (“One of the reasons that Lea Fastow wants to limit her jail time to five months is that she 
and her husband have two young children, and they’re trying to structure their pleas so they’re not both 
in jail at the same time.”). 
 53 Flood, supra note 44, at A1 (“A family friend said Lea Fastow is willing to consider pleading 
guilty and forgoing a chance to tell her side to a jury because it would be better for her two small child-
ren and could ensure they would not be without a parent at home.”). 
 54 See Mary Flood, Fastows to Plead Guilty Today; Feds Now Focus on Skilling, Lay, HOUS. 
CHRON., Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (“The plea bargains for the Fastows, who said they wanted to be sure their 
two children are not left parentless, have been in limbo for more than a week.”). 
 55 Flood & Pugh, supra note 50. 
 56 See Mary Flood, Lea Fastow Begins Prison Sentence; Ex-Enron CFO’s Wife Arrives Early to 
Start 1-year Term, HOUS. CHRON., July 13, 2004, at A1; Farrell & O’Donnell, supra note 52, at 1B 
(“U.S. District Judge David Hittner told Lea Fastow Wednesday that he refused to be locked in to the 
five-month prison sentence that her lawyers had negotiated with prosecutors.”). 
 57 See Flood, Lea Fastow Begins Prison Sentence, supra note 56. 
